My scholarly agenda has organically grown since I started teaching as a fellow in NYU School of Law's lawyering program. While there, I met some computer scientists whose work on machine-learning programs tools had clear implications for litigation. From these conversations, I wrote Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 821 (2018), which examined how predictive coding tools used to streamline discovery can subtly erode civil litigants' right to have a voice in proceedings and to understand the reasoning behind legal processes and decisions.

During my research for Technological Opacity, I saw that the growth of electronically stored information has led to one constant—an ever-increasing pressure on the finite resources of both the judiciary and litigants. Courts, through their discovery rules, direct where that pressure will be channeled. But, like any force in a closed system, this pressure must be sent somewhere. In Discovery Hydraulics, 52 UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW 1317 (2019), I  explored this phenomenon and offered a purposive taxonomy of discovery reform efforts.

In looking at how parties attempted to deal with voluminous electronically stored information as part of the prior two articles, I noticed that private confidentiality agreements between parties were regularly entered by courts, shielding litigation materials from public view. So, in Contracting for Confidential Discovery, 53 UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW 1249 (2020), I looked at the treatment of 100 proposed orders and identified an unexpected risk of permitting parties to customize procedure: the importation of legal errors, by party agreement, into judicial practice.

In thinking about AI discovery tools and the pressure they have placed on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I realized that similar technological developments were creating fissures in longstanding professional responsibility rules too. This realization led to Ad Tech & the Future of Legal Ethics, 73 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW 107 (2021), in which I drew on modern privacy scholarship to explain how lawyers' use of online behavioral advertising can lead to privacy invasions and manipulation that are not prohibited by the existing rules of professional conduct.

My next article, Fee Retrenchment in Immigration Habeas, 90 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 1489 (2022), grew out of a combination of my procedural justice scholarship, participation in an amicus brief, and some earlier work on attorneys' fees. I critiqued a relatively new challenge to the decades-long understanding that the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) covers immigration habeas proceedings, rooting this analysis in the Mathews framework.

As I was finalizing Fee Retrenchment, I was a discussant at a civil procedure session at the 2020 SEALS Annual Conference. That conversation made me question the conventional wisdom that there is virtually no appellate oversight of discovery. Following this line of inquiry, in Discovery Dark Matter, 101 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1021 (2023), I examined the extent to which the Supreme Court's use of its soft authority is affecting decision-making on discovery issues by providing trial-level judges with a window into the Court's view of the underlying principles and normative tradeoffs. 

I then merged my interests in civil procedure and professional responsibility in Ethical Guardrails to Unbounded Procedure, 93 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 49 (2024). I explained how professional-conduct rules should be understood to apply to guide the seemingly unlimited discretion of the federal district courts when they encounter a practice innovation that is not directly addressed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I used common-benefit fees in multi-district litigation as a case study, again, linking back to my early work on attorneys' fees.

Building off this foray into complex litigation and my background with discovery practices, I contributed a short essay, Discovery Gamesmanship in Mass Torts, 74 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 175 (2025), to the 2024 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy.

My current work-in-progress, Preventive Transparency in Third-Party Litigation Funding, 120 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW  REVIEW __ (forthcoming 2025), also grew out of my interest in discovery and increased exposure to complex litigation. In this forthcoming piece, I analyze the existing procedural and ethical rules that govern whether third-party litigation funding must be disclosed.

In another project, Meta-Discovery, I look at the accelerating trend of litigation fights over "discovery on discovery," which is an important issue. Practically, judicial decisions addressing fights over discovery on discovery are increasingly common and the jurisprudence dictates how litigators approach their discovery obligations. Doctrinally, the current dominant approach ignores the history of Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(g). The court’s disregard also might exemplify some of the troubles with unbounded civil procedure and have unintended downstream implications. Conceptually, the evolving meta-discovery doctrine involves some of the thorniest questions of contemporary procedure such as the role of legal tech in transforming adversarialism and how to manage difficult normative tradeoffs inherent in the use of artificial intelligence tools.